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RECENT DECISIONS
EVIDENCE - NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE - STATUTE HELD To PREvENT FORCED
DISCLOSURE OF DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS. - The Philadelphia Eve-
ning and Sunday Bulletin printed an article on alleged corruption in city govern-
ment, "Fitzpatrick's Secret Talk to the DA is Bared," in which it was reported
that the District Attorney had refused to make public transcripts of the interroga-
tions of John J. Fitzpatrick, Democratic ward leader and former sergeant at arms
of the City Council, but that the Bulletin now had access to them.' Upon refusal
of the City Editor and General Manager to obey a subpoena duces tecum and to
produce tape recordings, written statements, memoranda of interviews and other
tangible evidence documenting this article, the Court of Quarter Sessions of the
County of Philadelphia found them guilty of contempt. This court ruled that the
privilege established by statute protecting the newsman's "source of information"
protects a newsman only against the compulsory disclosure of the identity
of persons and does not protect him or them against the compulsory dis-
closure of documents or other inanimate materials.2
The judgment was appealed on the ground that the Pennsylvania newsman's
privilege statute exempting disclosure of "the source" included in its protection
documents and other materials. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, accepting
appellants' interpretation of the statute, held: the orders of the Court of Quarter
Sessions reversed and vacated the sentences. In the Matter of Taylor, 412 Pa. 32,
193 A.2d 181 (1963).
The Taylor case not only affects newspapermen of Pennsylvania but in a
larger sense the press throughout the country.3 It is only the second reported case
to interpret a newsman's privilege statute and is the first to interpret the phrase
"source of information" which is the criteria used in eleven5 of the twelve statutes."
For more than three centuries it has been recognized as a fundamental maxim
that the public has a right to every man's evidence.7 Incident to this right is the
corresponding duty to make requisite sacrifices of time, labor, privacy and often
of knowledge one would preferably keep to himself in view of the disagreeable
consequences of disclosure." "The policy of the law is to require disclosure of all
information by witnesses in order that justice might prevail."" Diametrically
opposed is the policy "that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public;"' 0 con-
sequently, to any extent that a rule of law is permitted to inhibit newsmen in
obtaining information from those who desire confidentiality, the flow of news is
diminished and the public's right to know suffers.'
If newspapers were limited to publishing only such news as had the
source identified, the usefulness of the press would be immeasurably dam-
aged. Anonymity for the public official, the government employee in lower
1 Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin, Dec. 30, 1962.
2 In re Matter of Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181, 183 (1963) (Emphasis added).
3 This fact is illustrated by the interest of amicus curiae American Newspaper Publishers
Association with a membership representing more than ninety per cent of the total daily and
Sunday circulation of newspapers published in this country.
4 The other is State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
5 But see: MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 945 (1) (1954).
6 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 370 (1960); ARxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1962);
ARx. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (Supp. 1961); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1881 (6) (Supp.
1962); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (Supp. 1962); Ky. Rnv. STAT. § 421.100 (1955); MD. ANN.
CoDE, art. 35, § 2 (1957); McH. STAT. ANN. § 28-945 (1) (1954); MONT. REV. COD'ES ANN.
tit. 93, ch. 601-2 (Supp. 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 and 2A:84A-29 (Supp. 1962);
Oro REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28 § 330 (1958).
7 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
8 Id. at 72.
9 People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415, 416 (1936).
10 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
11 Brief For American Newspaper Publishers' Association as Amicus Curiae p. 5.
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ranks and for the private citizen is, when promised by the reporter, fre-
quently the only key whose publication is in the public interest.'
2
The law of privilege is constantly straining to reconcile such conflicting policies.
Where other policy considerations were deemed of greater interest the legislatures
and courts ameliorated the strict general rule of full disclosure. The common law
extended the privilege to lawyer-client' s and husband-wife 4 communications while
most legislatures have added priest-penitent 5 and doctor-patient' to the list.
The most recent extension has been to journalists and accountants. In determin-
ing the scope of any of these privileges as with making the initial grant policy
considerations must be carefully balanced.
It has been the constant policy of newsmen to keep their sources of informa-
tion confidential,17 a principle which is embodied in the newsman's Code of
Ethics.' 8 Perhaps the raison d'etre of this policy is the public berefit in keeping
open the channels of news; possibly, it arises out of a professional pride in keep-
mng confidences.'- It has even been suggested that it is impelled not by altruistic
reasons but rather by economic survival in a highly competitive field.
20
Several notorious cases in the early thirties2' where reporters were held in con-
tempt and imprisoned for refusal to divulge the names of persons who supplied
information spotlighted the newsman's privilege question. The plight of these
latter-day Peter Zengers, dramatized by the press, aroused public opinion against
the judicial attempts to compel breaches of confidences. Many legislatures con-
sidered newsman's privilege legislation, 22 and in the eleven-year period between
1933 and 1943, ten of the privilege statutes now in force were passed.2  To date
the legislatures of twelve states24 have determined that this valuable right in the
free flow of news will be protected by extending to newsmen the privilege of pro-
tecting "the source '2 5 of their information from judicial inquiry.
It is the determination of the limits of this privilege that concerned the court
in the instant case. Three alternatives are presented to the Taylor court: (1) to
strictly construe the statute as in Donovan as protecting only the identity of the
person who supplied the information; (2) to protect the identities of all persons
mentioned explicitly or identified implicitly, by allowing an editing of the informa-
tion before it must be presented to the court (a suggestion made by the Court of
the Quarter Sessions); (3) to grant an all-inclusive privilege, embracing both iden-
tities and complete documents.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in an unprecedented pursual of the last-
named course held the Act must
be liberally and broadly construed in order to carry out the clear objective
and intent of the Legislature which has placed the gathering and the protec-
tion of the source of news as of greater importance to the public interest and
12 N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1949, p. 16, col. 2 (editorial).
13 Berd v. Lovelace, Cary 62, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577).
14 Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897).
15 8 WIGMORE, EVIMENCE § 2395 note 1, at 873-76 (McNaughton rev. 1961) cites and
summarizes statutes.
16 Id., § 2380 note 5, at 819-27 lists statutes.
17 See Editor and Publisher, Sept. 1, 1934, p. 9.
18 N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1942, p. 1 col. 2.
19 Editor and Publisher, supra note 17.
20 Note, 36 VA. L. REv. 61 (1950).
21 See People ex tel. Mooney v. Sheriff, supra note 9, for unreported cases. See also Editor
and Publisher Sept. 1, 1934, p. 9; 45 YALE L. J. 357 (1936).
22 Attempts have been made to date to enact such legislation in thirteen other states. See
Article, 9 CLEV. MAR. L. REv. 313 (1960).
23 Alabama (1935), Arizona (1937), Arkansas (1936), California (1935), Indiana (1941),
Kentucky (1936), Maryland (1896), Michigan (1949), Montana (1943), New Jersey (1933),
Ohio (1941), Pennsylvania (1937). See supra note 6 for citations.
24 See statutes cited note 6 supra.
25 These words are used in all but the Michigan statute, supra note 5.
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of more value to the public welfare than the disclosure of the alleged crime
or the alleged criminal. 26
The court's liberal construction included a document or other inanimate
object as "a source of information," within the meaning of the statute.27 In arriv-
ing at an interpretation there was no legislative history to rely on.28 The absence
of precedent gave the court carte blanche in construing statutory language. Cer-
tainly there was no mandate to construe it liberally.
While dictionaries29 define source as one whom or that which supplied in-
formation, the courts"0 and law journals3 ' have used the word synonymously with
person. In fact the New York Law Revision Commission concluded that the only
reason for granting the privilege is that protection of the identity of the informant
is necessary to enable the newsman to obtain information for public dissemination.
2
State v. Donovan3 3 is the only other reported decision dealing with the inter-
pretation of a newspaperman's privilege statute. As the New Jersey statute con-
strued in Donovan is similar to the Pennsylvania statute one might expect the
Pennsylvania court to give it serious consideration. Dictum in the majority opinion
and the dissenting opinion in Donovan would have offered insight into the inter-
pretation of "source." The dissenter construed the statute as "designed to avoid
disclosure of the name of the person who supplied the information,"3 4 while the
majority opinion twice refers to "the author or source."35 The court, however, feels
the Donovan decision is inapposite because the New Jersey Supreme Court
arrived at a restrictive interpretation by applying the rule that statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law must be strictly construed;36 whereas the Pennsylvania
Statutory Construction Act3 7 provides that such rule will have no application to
the laws of that state.3"
In an unreported decision, State v. Hamilton Owens,3 9 it was held that under
the Maryland statute a newspaper reporter was privileged to decline to produce a
document before the grand jury, but this court never defined "source."
While the extension of the privilege to employees of radio and television
stations in 195940 evidences a legislative policy favorable to the extension of privi-
lege, it seems that the phrase "source of information" was never intended by the
legislature to grant such an all-inclusive privilege. It is submitted that the use of
this particular phrase can more accurately be attributed to a parroting or pirating
of the original Maryland statute than to a particular legislative intent to include
documents and other inanimate objects within the statutory protection.
The mere fact that the communication was made in express confidence of a
confidential relationship does not create a privilege. The "point of honor" has dis-
appeared forever as a motive for recognizing a privilege.4' The modern requisites
for the establishment of privilege are embodied in Wigmore's classic formula:
26 In re Matter of Taylor, supra note 2, at 186.
27 Id., at 185-186. (Partly italicized in original.)
28 Brief For American Newspaper Publishers' Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 5.
29 MERRIAm-WasTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY, p. 2177 (3d ed. 1961); 10
OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, pp. 475-76 (1933).
30 State v. Donovan, supra note 4; Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d
473 (1956).
31 E.g., Indiana Legislation - 1941, 17 IND. L. J. 162, 165 (1941); Legislation, 9 So.
CAL. L. Rv. 343 (1936).
32 NEW YoR LAw R vIsIoN CoMMissioN, Leg. Doc. No. 65(A), p. 27 (1949).
33 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
34 Id. at 428 (Emphasis added).
35 Id. at 426.
36 Ibid.
37 Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46 § 558 (1958).
38 In re Matter of Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
39 No. 677 Misc. 1925, Circuit Court, Carroll County, Md., May 11, 1925.
40 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 28, § 330 (1958).
41 See Duchess of Kingstons' Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 586 (1776), Notable British Trials
Series 256 (Melville ed. 1927).
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(1) ,The communications must originate in a confidence-that they will
not be disclosed. (2) The element of confidentialit must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3)
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by
the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit there-
by gained for the correct disposal of litigation.42
While a community might feel that a journalist privilege is beneficial and
should be fostered, a re-evaluation must definitely follow a statutory interpreta-
tion which radically extends the privilege. Certainly when an unconditional
privilege is granted as in the Taylor case compliance with the third and fourth
Wigmorian requisites is questionable.
The legislature may have had reasons for using words which would include
documents in the scope of the privilege. First, such documents on their face might
reveal from whom they were obtained. Second, documents might disclose the
names of other individuals who were sources of information obtained by news-
men.43 Another possibility is that while the individual giving the information
may not care about the disclosure of his own identity he might well wish to pro-
tect others whose names appear in the documents but whose identities have been
assured him nondisclosure by the press.
If the courts (as the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia) permit the
newsman to protect not only the name of the informant but also other identities
included in, or subject to, disclosure by the documents which he has assured the
informant would be protected, there is no reason for withholding the information
itself. The information was conveyed to the newspaper for the purpose of publi-
cation. This alternative seems to be the farthest extension justified in reconciling
the ambivalent policy considerations. Any further extension upsets the balance; the
injury of disclosure is no longer greater than the benefit thereby gained.
The American Bar Association's Committee on the Improvement of the Law
of Evidence44 proposed that the correct tendency would be the narrowing of the
scope of existing privileges. Significantly neither the Model Code of Evidence
adopted in 1942 nor the Uniform Rules of Evidence approved in 1953 recognize
this privilege.4" In lieu of adequate supervision of the newspaper profession,46 even
staunch advocates of the privilege are reticent to make it too broad or general. 47
As every privilege is a roadblock in the search for truth, the extension of privi-
lege must be cautiously limited to prevent serious obstacles in the path of justice.
Thus the Taylor case appears to be an unnecessary and unwarranted extension
which under the banner of a free and unfettered press may have even distorted
"the legislative purpose of the free flow of news by giving newsmen the license to
prevent news from ever reaching the public." 48 Richard D. Catenacci
RES JUDICATA - COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL - DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO
RELrrIGATE AN IssuE DECIDED ADVERSELY TO HIM IN PRIOR ACTION, AS AGAINST
PLAINTIFF NOT A PARTY TO THE PRIOR ACTION. - A group of five employees
brought suit under Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act against the
Glidden Co. to establish their seniority rights, under a collective bargaining con-
42 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
43 Brief for Appellants, Robert L. Taylor and Earl Selby, p. 5.
44 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
45 Id. at 536-7.
46 See Gallup, Further Consideration of a Privilege For Newsmen, 14 ALBANY L. Rav. 16
(1950).
47 NEw YORK LAw REvISION COmmIsSION, supra note 32.
48 In re Matter of Taylor, supra note 38 (Dissenting opinion).
1 29 U.S.C. § 185.
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tract, at a removed plant site. The issue was decided adversely to the Glidden Co.2
Subsequently, a second group of approximately 160 employees, situated identically
to the original five, sought to take advantage of the earlier determination by
seeking similar relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held:
that the Glidden Co. was estopped to relitigate the interpretation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement where it had been afforded a full hearing on that issue
in the prior action, despite the company's offer to introduce new evidence relevant
to construction of the contract. The fact that these plaintiffs were not parties to
the original suit was held to be immaterial. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.'d 944
(2d Cir. 1964).
With this decision the Second Circuit has significantly expanded the number
and types of situations in which persons may take advantage of determinations
made in prior litigation to which they were not a party, added a new dimension
to the law of collateral estoppel, and struck a severe blow at the by now somewhat
anachronistic common law requirement of mutuality of estoppel.
The common statement of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is that when
... a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and deter-
mined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the
parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action.. .. ,3 Res judicata
is a more general rule by which a final judgment on the merits becomes conclu-
sive between the parties in a subsequent suit on the same cause of action
"... not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might
have been offered for that purpose.' 4 In the present case the question was one
of collateral estoppel since it involved use of a prior determination in a different
cause of action.-
The traditional and orthodox limitation on the reach of collateral estoppel is
that it is available as a basis of a claim or a defense only as between the parties
to the original action, or persons who are in privity with those parties.6 It was
thought rather unsporting to allow a person to take advantage of a judgment
without; h-ving- exposed himself to the risk of an adverse ruling had the case
gone the other way.7 This judicial feeling laa been enshrined - one of those
marvelously terse legal platitudes: "estoppels must be mutual."" The single gener-
ally recognized exception to this rule requiring mutuality and identity of parties
involves situations in which the liability of one person is wholly dependent on the
liability of another. Such relationships as indemnitor-indemnitee and master-
servant typically fall within the dispensation.9 The exemption is necessary to pre-
vent the judicial embarrassment which would doubtless result from inconsistent
decisions holding, for example, a master liable for his servant's negligence after
the servant had been absolved. Thus, where there exists a relation with a possible
liability over, the party so related can make use of a prior judgment in a different
cause of action without having been himself a party to the action. However, no
such relationship was present between the two groups of employees in the Zdanok
case.
2 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961).
3 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
4 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). See also Lawlor v. National
Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
5 It seems that each employee has a separate and independent cause of action on the
collective bargaining contract. See Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
6 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). See also Gilman v. Gilman, 115 Vt. 49, 51
A.2d 46 (1947).
7 See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 407, at 889 (5th ed. 1925).
8 Id. at 890. See also Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912);
Pittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 63 S.E. 2d 34 (1951).
9 See, e.g., Davis v. Perryman, 225 Ark. 963, 286 S.W.2d 844 (1956); Myhra v. Park, 193
Minn. 290, 258 N.W. 515 (1935); Good Health Dairy Products Co. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14,
9 N.E. 2d 758 (1937).
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There seems to be a growing dissatisfaction with the rule of mutuality of
estoppel and the ungenerous exceptions so reluctantly allowed. One of the first
opinions to articulate this discontent grew out of a suit against a retailer for sub-
stitution of Pepsi-Cola for Coca-Cola.10 The Coca-Cola Co. lost, the court
having found that there had been no substitution. The defeated but undaunted
plaintiff then sued the Pepsi-Cola Co. on the basis of the same alleged substitu-
tion. The court apparently felt that this procedure placed far too great a strain
on the fiber of Delaware's jurisprudence.
[W]e are of the opinion that a plaintiff who deliberately selects his forum
and there unsuccessfully presents his proofs, is bound by such adverse judg-
ment in a second suit involving all the identical issues already decided.
The requirement of mutuality must yield to public policy. To hold other-
wise would be to allow repeated litigation of identical questions, expressly
adjudicated, and to allow a litigant having lost on a question of fact to
re-open and re-try all the old issues each time he can obtain a new adversary
not in privity with his former one."
Several years aftdr the Coca-Cola case, a root and branch attack on the rule of
mutuality of estoppel was made in Bernhard v. Bank of America. 2 Following this
lead a number of other courts have re-examined and limited the old rule to one
extent or another.'3 By now the trend is tolerably clear, but this is not to say that
it has been without its detractors.
The rule of collateral estoppel may be described as a compromise be-
tween the interest of the litigant in pressing his claim and the interest of the
public in bringing an end to one man's litigation .... But the rule does not
go so far as to make the finding in one man's case in a personal action a con-
clusion of ultimate truth. A law suit is not a laboratory experiment for the
discovery of physical laws of universal application but a means of settling
a dispute between litigants. That which is settled as a fact between them...
binds only the parties themselves and those who are in such relation to the
parties as to be considered in privity with them.' 4
What are some of the fundamental factors which must be considered in
evaluating the apparent direction of the newer cases, and more particularly the
Zdanok case? When is it proper to allow a person to take advantage of a deter-
mination made in earlier adjudication on a different cause of action where the
parties are no longer identical? It has b'eon obbui-cd that due process will prohibit
us of " plur lercrmination to conclude a person who was neither party nor privy
to the prior action and who for that reason has not had his day in court.
The criteria for determining who may assert a plea of res judicata differ
fundamentally from the criteria for determining against whom a plea of
res judicata may be asserted. The requirements of due process of law forbid
the assertion of a plea of res judicata against a party unless he was bound
by the earlier litigation in which the matter was decided .... He is bound
by that litigation only if he has been a party thereto or in privity with a
party thereto. . . . There is no compelling reason, however, for requiring
10 Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 Ad. 260 (1934).
11 Id. at 263.
12 Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Savings Assn., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942). Subsequently, the California Court of Appeals interpreted the Bernhard case as
limited to its facts and not permitting offensive use of a prior judgment. Nevarov v. Caldwell,
161 Cal. App. 2d 744, 327 P.2d 111 (1958). It is suggested that this case reached the correct
result but for the wrong reason. A father and son were both injured in an auto accident with
the defendant. The son, who was a passenger, sued the defendant and won on the basis of
defendant's negligence. In a later suit against the same defendant, the plaintiff father was
not permitted to rely on the earlier determination of negligence. The case should not have
been decided on the basis of "offensive use" of the prior determination, but rather should
have turned on the fact that the issues in the two cases were not identical. The first suit did
not establish the fact that the father was free from contributory negligence which would bar
recovery by the father in the second action. The son could sue either of two concurrently
negligent parties without concluding the parties as between themselves.
13 See, e.g., Hawley v. Davenport, R.I. & N.W. Ry., 242 Iowa 17, 45 N.W. 2d 513 (1951);
Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W. 2d 364 (1955); Israel v. Wood Dolson
Co., 1 N.Y. 2d 116, 134 N.E. 2d 97, 151 N.Y. Supp. 2d 1 (1956).
14 Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, 133 F.2d 143, 145 (3rd Cir. 1943).
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that the party asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a party, or
in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation.15
Stated another way this means that the maximum constitutionally permissible scope
of the collateral estoppel doctrine is that a prior determination of any issue may be
available for use by one not a party, but only as against a party to the original
action. Aside from this basic constitutional limitation, however, there are several
policies which militate in favor of liberalization of rules governing availability of
earlier determinations in subsequent actions. The first is the desire to bring an
end to repetitious litigation and to finally dispose of controversies. The second is
a felt need to have consistent treatment of identical questions. That is, likes should
be treated alike. It would be difficult to justify a position which would allow a
different construction of the contract in Zdanok for the second group of employees
simply because they were not parties to the original suit. It is also of question-
able propriety to force the later litigants to go through the expensive ritual of
another, trial to reaffirm an issue already thoroughly adjudicated. But, not-
withstanding whatever could be said in defense of a system which would permit
such multiple and potentially inconsistent relitigation, it does not appear that there
is any basic unfairness in prohibiting it.
There are two principal objections to allowing the rule of collateral estoppel
to run its constitutional cable's length and thus fill the area circumscribed by due
process.16 The first has to do with those situations in which, for tactical or eco-
nomic reasons, a party has not pressed his claim or presented his defenses with
all the vigor that he might wish to employ in a later action. It would seem
unreasonable to conclude a party from ever re-opening a question, as against a
new party, when the first judgment was not actually or fully contested. Such a
holding would tend to force litigants to put forth maximum efforts in actions
which they might otherwise be willing to concede, whenever there is a likelihood
of subsequent suits involving the same issue. This difficulty is overcome by the
simple expedient of limiting the availability of the earlier determination to those
cases in which the party to be concluded has had a full and fair hearing on the
merits of the, issue.17 The Restatement of Judgments, for example, restricts
collateral estoppel to questions which have been "actually litigated and
determined."' 8
The second of these objections is not so easily disposed of. The problem arises
when a person is faced with the possibility of a large number of suits, all of which
grow out of the same transaction, event, or occurrence, and all of which will
turn on the same issue. The oft cited example is the train wreck which results in
suits by one hundred passengers. Suppose that in the first suit 'there is a finding
that the railroad was not negligent. To hold that the remaining ninety-nine plaintiffs
are bound by this judgment would fly in the face of due process requirements.
But what if there were a finding of negligence in the first suit; should the railroad
be concluded in the subsequent ninety-nine actions? An even more anomalous
case would be one in which the railroad prevailed in the first forty-nine suits but
lost the fiftieth because of a sympathetic jury. Are the next fifty plaintiffs to be
allowed to rely on that one judgment? If there is no way to distinguish and
isolate the "railroad" cases, then the dispensation of Bernhard and Zdanok
champions a foredoomed cause. But, it is suggested that there are legitimate and
15 Bernhard v. Bank of Amirica Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892,
894 (1942).
16 See Moore and Currier Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REv.
301 (1961).
17 The burden of persuasion that the issue in question was not fully or adequately con-
tested in the prior action ought be placed on the original party against whom the plea is
raised. A default judgment is a prima fade showing of a lack of hearing. In the Zdanok case
the court made it clear that the Glidden Co. had a full hearing in the first suit. Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir. 1964).
18 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
critical distinctions, and that abrogation of the "mutuality of estoppel" rule does
not necessarily entail acceptance of the "railroad" cases.
The classic article in this field 9 undertakes to analyze the availability of
prior determinations to non-parties in terms of whether the party against whom
the plea is asserted was plaintiff or defendant in the first action, which position
he occupied in the subsequent action, and whether the plea of estoppel is asserted
in an offensive or defensive mode. Using this rather mechanical technique in an
effort to distinguish the "railroad" cases, the author concludes that "while the
plea may be asserted by a defendant against one who was a plaintiff in the prior
action, it may not be asserted by a plaintiff against one who was a defendant in
the prior action."'20 This was a fair distillation of the cases up to that time,
which, almost without exception, involved a disappointed plaintiff who had found
a new defendant. However, it is squarely incompatible with Zdanok, which in
turn, is indistinguishable (using this technique) from the "railroad" situation.
That is, both are assertions of estoppel by a plaintiff against a defendant who was
also the defendant in the original suit. This procedure having failed, what other
grounds are available on which to base a distinction?
Perhaps the most basic and pervasive idea is that collateral estoppel can be
thought of as a part of the arsenal of equitable remedies which never need be
used if they will tend to work an injustice or substantially prejudice one of the
parties. But the crucial consideration is the subject matter of the prior deter-
mination. That is, was it a question of law or one of fact; and, if one of fact, was
it a type of fact capable of fairly objective ascertainment or was it rather of a
subjective nature? The fact of substitution in the Coca-Cola case would, accord-
ing to this proposed standard, qualify as an "objective" fact, whereas the fact of
negligence or due care in the "railroad" cases would be classified as "subjec-
tive" fact. Subjective facts are those which, like negligence, contain many elements
not reducible to clear formulas and which hinge largely on opinion judgments
about which reasonable fact-finders might reasonably differ. Determinations of
questions of law and objectively ascertainable fact, on the other hand, ought not
change simply because of a change in parties. It is recognized that the law-fact
dichotomy is not always clear, but this is only to say that there will be difficult
cases and differences of opinion. It is also undeniable that a trial is not a labora-
tory for determination of ultimate truth, but this ideal is more nearly attainable
for some types of questions than for others. For example, the pivotal issue in the
Zdanok case (interpretation of a contract) was close to being a question of law.
But even if thought of as one of fact, it is not of a kind dependent on the peculiar
infirmities which inhere in determinations of such highly subjective facts as negli-
gence or due care. Closely allied to these considerations is the inquiry as to
whether the initial determination was made by judge or jury. Perhaps the latter
could justifiably be afforded less conclusiveness for purposes of collateral estoppel
than the former, particularly if the subject matter is highly subjective fact. Using
these suggested distinctions, the "railroad" cases can be easily isolated from Zdanok
or Bernhard and its progeny. Other rationalizations of the Zdanok decision could
be made, such as an analogy to a class action in which all members of the class
are bound by and may take the benefit of an adjudication of the rights of the
class,21 or by an expansion of the concept of "privity" to include all members of
a class. But these explanations will ultimately prove too narrow to suffice, in that
situations structurally like Zdanok can readily be imagined in which the successive
plaintiffs were not members of any single class but in which the use of collateral
estoppel would be fully justified. Class action and privity explanations will also
fail to distinguish the "railroad" cases.
19 Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L.
Rv. 281 (1957).
20 Id. at 294.
21 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959).
RECENT DECISIONS
Thus, the test to decide when a prior decision should be made available to a
litigant who was not a party or privy to the prior action should be: whenever
the subject matter of the original determination which is to be asserted as an
estoppel against one of the original parties is such as can reasonably be said to
be of a type capable of fairly objective ascertainment and which ought not to be
open to re-examination simply because of a change in parties; where there is no
basic unfairness to any party in allowing the plea; and where there was a full and
fair hearing on the merits in the original action, then the new party should be
permitted to take advantage of the original determination as against one of the
original parties regardless of the orientation of such parties as plaintiff or defendant
and notwithstanding the offensive or defensive mode of raising the plea. Admit-
tedly, this test does not possess the mechanical simplicity of the earlier rule, but
it is suggested that it will do far better service in explaining the current trend of
the case law.
In conclusion, Zdanok v. Glidden Co. is a significant extension of the rules
which allow use of determinations made in prior actions by persons who were
not parties to the earlier action. It is the first clear judicial statement that the
plea of estoppel may be available even to a plaintiff for use against one who was
a defendant in the original action 2 The case holds, in effect, that "the fact
that a party has not had his day in court on an issue as against a particular litigant
is not decisive... 23 in deciding whether a plea of collateral estoppel is applicable.
It is a cogent opinion and will very probably be followed by other courts.
John W. Beatty
22 Statements in earlier leading cases often went beyond what was required by the facts.
See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y. Supp. 2d 1(1956).
23 Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 99, 151 N.Y. Supp. 2d 1(1956).
